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RUSSIA TODAY, CYBERTERRORISTS
TOMORROW: U.S. F AlLURE TO PREPARE
DEMOCRACY FOR CYBERSPACE
Jonathan F. Lancelot
Norwich University

ABSTRACT
This paper is designed to expose vulnerabilities within the US electoral system, the use of
cyberspace to exploit weaknesses within the information assurance strategies of the democratic
and republican party organizations, and deficiencies within the social media communications and
voting machine exploits. A brief history of discriminatory practices in voting rights and voting
access will be set as the foundation for the argument that the system is vulnerable in the cyber
age, and the need for reform at the local, state and national levels will be emphasized. The
possibility of a foreign nation-state influencing the outcome of an election by using cyber warfare
tactics should give us pause as this opens the US democracy to terrorist organizations who have
the means to disrupt a US election via cyber-attack.

Governments keep their promises only when they are forced, or when it is to their advantage to do
so.
-Napoleon Bonaparte

l. THE ROOTS OF A

VULNERABLE
DEMOCRACY
If we want to get to the root of the problem of
US elections being influenced by forces other
than the winds of democracy and the will of
the American people, we must look to the
history of disenfranchisement and the exclusion
of specific groups of Americans from voting or
having a stronger voice within the public
dialog. For example, "throughout the history of
our country, those in power have devised a
multitude of devices to diminish voting power.
These include gerrymandered voting districts,
all-white primary elections, literacy tests, poll
taxes, arcane voter registration procedures, and
annexation of white suburban neighborhoods
by cities about to achieve a black voting
majority" (The JBHE Foundation, Inc, page.
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61). This is a reality of US history that still
haunts the US electoral system since the
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
There are remnants of the government's past
in disenfranchisement that continue to eat at
the social fabric and the democracy itself. "The
personal cost of voting is a potentially
important part of the decision calculus as well.
Recent voter-ID laws potentially increase this
cost in at least two ways. First, voters who fail
to supply the necessary identification may be
turned away without voting. Second, there are
sometimes monetary and preparation costs
associated with voter-ID laws that voters must
incur. These costs may be relatively low or
high depending on a voter's level of
sophistication, work flexibility , or income"
(Mycoff, Wagner, Wilson, page. 121). Third,
the sunsetting of important clauses within the
Voting Rights Act has allowed states to return
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to behavior that excluded certain voters and
continue to create room for fraud and new
vulnerabilities before we even explore the cyber
element of US elections. "Representative John
Lewis- an icon of the civil-rights strugglehighlighted remaining challenges to equitable
voting and called for continued work on rights"
(Graham, page. 4), and the fact that the
problem of rights is still an issue the US
government is struggling to demonstrate the
potential for an electoral disaster that will be
even worse than a rival nation-state interfering
in US elections.
The US Electoral System struggles with
corruption within the dealings of politicians (of
both major political parties), lobbyists and
donors. For instance, criminal behavior around
voting machines has placed doubt on the
integrity of election results. "Rep. Vernon
Ehlers (R-Mich.) lays most of the blame for
current electronic voting machine failures with
former Rep. Bob Ney (R-Ohio) , who preceded
Ehlers as House Administration chairman who
was sentenced in connection to his association
with disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff'
(Murray, page. 2). It also does not help to
secure a democratic system when unlimited
monetary funds can be dumped into a
candidate's campaign to give them an unfair
advantage or can be dumped into an election
cycle to influence the results on election day.
"In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme
Court again addressed a First Amendment
challenge
to
the
ban
on
corporate
electioneering activities. After two rounds of
brief and oral arguments, a narrow majority of
the Court overturned Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce and portions of
McConnell v. FEC and struck down the
portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 that prohibited expenditures on
electioneering communications by corporations"
(The Harvard Law Review Association, page.
76). The roots of vulnerability within the US
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election system are broad, and election
interference (in the democratic process) is not
a new problem. What is new is the ability of
rival nation-states and terrorist organizations
to utilize cybercrime, cyber espionage, and
cyber warfare to disrupt the democratic
process, endangering the citizenry.

2.DEEPROOT
ANALYTICS: GIVING
AWAY THE SHOP
Information gathering on voter attitudes and
preferences is nothing new m American
politics. Democratic and Republican parties are
both patrons of companies like Deep Root
Analytics that give them an edge in predicting
voter behavior and tethering their strategies to
such information. Unfortunately, "the firm left
198 million voter records unsecured online for
nearly two weeks. This should give every
American pause, particularly at a time when
intelligence
officials
say
the
Russian
government actively seeks to undermine
American elections" (Lapawsky, page. 2). The
data theft was significant, and the amount of
data stolen is staggering. "This particular
breach, discovered by researcher Chris Vickery,
exposed 1.1 terabytes of personal information
compiled by Deep Roots Analytics, a company
that analyzes not just basic data like names
and addresses, but also scores how particular
voters feel about a range of political issues,
from gun control to offshoring in the auto
industry. Vickery's discovery illustrates how
poorly
organizations
safeguard
sensitive
information" (Lapawsky, page. 2). As every
aspect of a person and organizations life is in
cyberspace, democratic institutions are no
different. Secure US elections as they are
structured today provides no security and
integrity to the vote and provide no
cybersecurity
information
assurance.
or
Questionable data collection does not always
have to be from a breach; the controversy
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between Facebook and Cambridge Analytica is
an instance where a social media company
seemed to hand over customer data over a
private data collecting organization, which
made efficient use of the information towards a
political end . "Cambridge Analytica, a political
data firm fired by President Trump's 2016
election campaign, gained access to private
information on more than 50 million Facebook
users. The firm offered tools that could identify
the personalities of American voters and
influence their behavior" (Granville, New York
Times). In this case, Face book was allegedly
complicit in the scheme. How much the
company at the highest levels knew, and when
they knew it does not even matter at this
point,
Facebook is currently receiving
from
governments
devastating
criticism
internationally for their lack of oversight in
customer privacy. In the United Kingdom
(UK) , "the Digital, Culture, Media, and Sports
(DCMS) Select Committee's far-reaching
interim report on its 18-month investigation
into fake news and the use of data and 'dark
ads' in elections offer a wide-ranging, informed
and sustained critique that with it the full
weight of parliament. The verdict is withering:
Facebook failed" (Cadwalladr, The Guardian).
The failure is rooted in the social media
company's recalcitrance in mitigating the
unauthorized release of customer data,
deliberate or not. In concurrence, the fact that
a
political campaign hired
Cambridge
Analytica leads to the issue of domestic abuses
of elections which is an issue embedded within
the history of US political culture.
The fact that US politicians have
influenced elections domestically using illegal
methods is well known. However, the
implications of US politicians influencing
elections with the aid of a foreign nation-state
or foreign entity is disastrous . "Suspicion has
mounted about whether the Trump campaign
somehow colluded with Russian actors to
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influence American voters" (Lapawsky, page.
2). This matter is still under investigation. The
2016 election was rife with elements of
cybercrime, and the case of the DNC hacking
incident is most intriguing, as the cybercrime
of hacking into DNC servers exposed domestic
instances of anti-democratic practices within
the Democratic primary. "The Kremlin has
denied Russian involvement in the DNC
breach. But the reverberations continued;
DNC Chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz
resigned after emails revealed what many views
as the unfair treatment of Bernie Sanders"
(Glaser, Page. 4). The damage to the DNC
organization was devastating, and the events
of 2016 revealed that cyberwarfare is a reality
as there is no guarantee the US government
will be able to react to the next attempt on an
election in the future . The democratic and
republican organizations in the US Congress
have shown no signs of coming together to
solve the issue of cybersecurity and democracy
and continue the behavior of hyperpartisanship which is a continuation of
widening the fissures that makes future cyberattacks on our elections more likely. "All is it
amounts to a political system that needs to
devote at least as much energy into securing
its systems as it does into securing votes. At
this point, there is no saying they weren't
warned" (Lapawsky, page. 6), and it seems
today the warnings has caused some panicking
within the beltway.

3 . CAN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS
THW"ARTTHE
DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS?
In cyberspace, a non-state
as much damage as an
nation-state,
and
it
anonymously. Therefore,

organization can do
organization or a
could
be
done
it is logical to
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conclude that if Russia can allegedly do it, so
can a sophisticated terror organization. For
instance, "on February 16t h , 2018 Special
Counsel Robert S. Mueller III indicted 13
Russian individuals and three Russian
organizations for engaging in operations to
interfere with US political and electoral
processes, including the 2016 presidential
election. This was a significant step forward in
exposing a surreptitious social media campaign
and holding account those responsible for this
attack" (US House of Representatives). The
importance of looking at this issue beyond
nation-state borders, as nation-states can
either accept or deny responsibility is critical.
In this case, the Russian government denies
responsibility. "Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov came away from the meeting saying
Trump had heard out Putin's assurances that
Moscow did not run a hacking and
disinformation effort and had dismissed the
entire US investigation into Russian role"
(Filipov, Paletta, Phillip). Diplomatically, if we
consider the Russian government was not
involved with the hacking of the 2016 election,
we should have pressed them to conduct their
own investigation and give us their conclusion
so both nation-states can narrow it down. If
they refused, only then we would know
conclusively if the Russian government was
involved. Did the 13 Russian individuals and
the three Russian organizations act as
individuals? It is a reasonable question
knowing the nature of the worldwide network
'
and the capability of acting anonymously or
with a false identity. "Most hacking is
motivated by nefarious and fraudulent aims."
(Hampson, page. 516). In fact, the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has calculated
the financial cost to victims of cybercrimes
outside the realm of political campaigns. In
2017, "the Internet Crime Complaint Center
(IC3) says victims' losses exceeded 1.4 Billion
in 2017. Top ten crimes types reported to IC3
(by victim loss) are:

•

Real Estate/ Rentals, $56,231 ,333

•

Investment, $96,844,144

•

Advance Fee, $57,861,324

•

Corporate Data Breach, $60,942,306

•

Confidence Fraud/ Romance, $211,382,989

•

Identity Theft, $66, 815,298

•

Non-Payment / Non-Delivery,
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$141,110,441

•

Personal Data Breach, $77,134,865

•

Credit Card Fraud, $57,207,248

•

Business

E-Mail

Account

Compromise,

Compromise/ E-Mail
$676 ,151,185"

(FBI.gov).
So, we can conclude that well-funded
terrorist and criminal organizations are capable
of hacking elections, as long as they are
supported by a nation-state's resources and a
strategic objective, for example organizing a
massive DDoS attack on multiple candidate
websites, or hack voter databases. Dan
Wallach, a computer science professor at Rice
University, notes that the internet is a 'messy
place' with a lot of background traffic, and it
would be difficult to find its origin because
attackers are very good at hiding their
location" (Sainz, page. 3). Therefore, the
question is how do we verify a cyber-attack
from a nation-state if government leaders deny
responsibility? Most of all, how do we prevent
democratic systems from being hijacked by
rivals and terrorists?

4. POSSIBLE SOLUTION:
E-GOVERNANCE
Lawmakers should consider legislation to
protect the integrity of election results, election
information, and democracy itself. "Officials
bear a responsibility to our people and our
Republic to embrace the best possible options,
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and there are already opportunities to start.
After election authorities learn of the
advantages and scalability of blockchain
voting, there is no excuse why they would
continue to opt for only paper or only legacy
electronic machines" (Spanos, page. 2) unless
they benefit somehow from the dysfunction
and vulnerabilities within
the system.
Blockchain technology is one possibility of
protecting voting and election results, yet there
are noted issues and concerns with the
innovation. "Blockchain at its core is a peer-topeer
distributed
ledger
that
is
cryptographically
secure,
append-only,
immutable (extremely difficult to change) , and
updateable only via consensus or agreement
among peers" (Bashir, page. 16). Conversely,
there are ways this innovative system can be
hacked as well. First, "a Sybil Attack is an
attack in which the same party owns a large
number of nodes on a single network and
attempt to disrupt network activity through
flooding the network with bad transactions or
manipulating
the
relaying
of
valid
transactions" (Risberg). Second, "a routing
attack is an attack made possible by the
compromise or cooperation of an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) " (Risberg). Third, "a
Direct Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is an
attempt by bad actors to cripple a server,
anything from a website to a Bitcoin node, by
flooding it with high volumes of traffic"
(Risberg). Lastly, "The 51 percent or majority
attack, since the security of a blockchain is
directly linked to the computer power building
the chain, there is the threat of an attacker
gaining control over a majority of the hash
power on the network" (Risberg). Blockchain
technology is not a silver bullet and has
vulnerabilities, yet some benefits need to be
examined. For example, "Blockchain-secure
voting machines work by allowing the voter to
scan their own paper ballot, at which point the
vote is simultaneously and immutably entered
into the blockchain tally. A code is generated
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for the voter and observers, who are able to reinput the code to verify that the vote-with
chain-of-custody proving the time and
location- are forever entered into the result.
This means that for the first time, elections are
fully transparent and publicly auditable, down
to each and every vote" (Spanos, page. 2). The
US electoral system is federated and
decentralized.
Blockchain allows for
a
distributed software structure that would
mirror the different features of each state's
electoral rules, increase the transparency and
verify the integrity of every vote. "Centralized
and distributed systems are architectural
antipodes . Technical antipodes have always
inspired engineers to create hybrid systems
that inherit the strength of the parents"
(Drescher, page.15).
A blockchain voting
system is a possible solution, or a partial
solution to election fraud on most levels
because of what the technology sets out to
achieve. "The core problem to be solved by the
blockchain is achieving and maintaining
integrity in a purely distributed peer-to-peer
system that consists of an unknown number of
peers
with
unknown
reliability
and
trustworthiness. This problem is not a new
one" (Drescher, page.31). An example of a
nation-state
implementing
blockchain
is
Estonia, "Its government is virtual, borderless,
blockchained, and secure" (Heller). The
country learned the hard way when their
critical
telecommunications
infrastructure
experienced a cyber-attack in 2007. Today,
technology is linked throughout the society,
and data is not collected in a centralized
location and is protected by encryption at each
node. "E-Estonia is the most ambitious project
in technological statecraft today, for it includes
all members of the government, and alters
citizens' daily lives. The normal services that
government is involved with-legislation,
voting, education, justice, healthcare, banking,
taxes, policing, and so on- have been digitally
linked across one platform, wiring up the
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nation" (Heller). In Estonia, it's called egovernance.
The structure of this system is arranged
where citizens can vote anywhere securely.
"Internet voting, or i-Voting, is a system that
allows voters to cast their ballots from any
internet-connected computer anywhere in the
world. Completely unrelated to the electronic
voting systems used elsewhere, which involved
costly and problematic machinery" (e-estonia).
Cybernetica, the company that developed iVoting states "the i-voting system consists of
Vote Forwarding Server, Vote Storing Server,
and Counter Server. They are responsible for
respectively collecting, storing and tabulating
i-votes. Counting Server is offline at all times
due
to
high-security
requirements"
(Cybernetica). The next level of the system is
"during a designated pre-voting period, the
voter logs onto the system using an ID-card or
Mobile-ID, and casts a ballot. The voter's
identity is removed from the ballot before it
reaches the National Electoral Commission for
counting, thereby ensuring anonymity" (eestonia). The downside of blockchain voting
and remote voting is addressed as "with any
method of remote voting, including traditional
postal ballots, the possibility of votes being
forced or bought is a concern. Estonia's
solution was to allow voters to log on and vote
as many times as they want during the prevoting period. Since each vote cancels the last
'
a voter always has the option of changing his
or her vote later" (e-estonia). This is a possible
solution for our current electoral system,
voting, and governance. Innovation is key to
maintaining a stable democracy for the 2ist
century, and tech companies like Cybernetica,
Nortal
with
verification
services,
and
OpenNodem,
Ericsson,
Telia,
State
Infocommunication Foundation, and Dell EMC
for cloud services helped Estonia develop the egovernance system. This is a model for the US
to aspire to and develop a system that is not
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as open to exploit as it is today. Currently, the
US dealing with companies in charge of
holding sensitive voter data for political
campaigns
getting
hacked
and
using
technologies that have easily breached
vulnerabilities. For instance, "A political
robocalling company called RoboCent exposed
4,500 client files to the open internet by failing
to properly configure its cloud storage on
Amazon Web Services" (Nordrum). This is a
devastating development that not only exposed
voter behavior to anyone willing to seek it out;
it endangers the very fiber of trust that is the
foundation of any true democracy. To solve
the issue of vulnerabilities that are created by
voter
suppression,
misinformation
from
traditional and social media organizations,
political
campaign
hacking, legislatively
crippling partisanship, unlimited campaign
donations to candidates, and political parties'
officials rigging primary elections to the
advantage of their favored candidates, it must
be established that political cultures which
encourage
vice
and
corruption
is
counterintuitive
to
what
a
powerful
cybersecurity strategy can offer. "What is
often overlooked is the central role anticorruption, and human factors have to play in
countering this new technological menace"
(Black). The unifying and open nature of the
internet has also exposed and magnified the
deep flaws in the democratic process. It is a
contradiction for elected officials to state they
want to prevent interference, yet the constant
specter of corruption and illegal machination
remains as we continue into new election
cycles. "The leaders of four US intelligence
agencies reaffirmed at the White House on
Thursday that 'pervasive' and 'ongoing'
threats from foreign actors, including Russia,
to interfere m upcoming US elections"
(Breuninger). Fortunately, "on January 6th,
2017, the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) designated election
systems as critical infrastructure, created as a
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subsector under the existing government
security sector" (Homeland Security), yet this
is not enough to protect our democracy and
our national security. We need a unified
government to agree on issues that address the
vulnerabilities in our cyber-defense capabilities.
Currently, there is no consensus on how to
approach intermestic cyber policy and law
enforcement issues. Nevertheless, the state of
Utah used Cybernetica's i-Vote technology
"during 2016 Republican presidential caucus on
the 22 nd of March; voters had the opportunity
to vote using the traditional methods or vote
online" (Cybernetica) . Consequently, there is
no reason or excuse for the US government not
to protect and defend the democratic
institution enshrined by the Founders, and
that is synonymous with protecting and
defending the US Constitution. Today, waiting
for the 9-11 of cyber-attack to react to a zeroday event takes us from a dangerous situation
to a potentially crippling one. There needs to
be a national conversation on the deep issues
that divide and brings the people together, a
conversation that will lead us to an upgraded
method of governing our democracy. However,
we are facing rivals that can shut down our
elections with the push of a button, and time
is running out.
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